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EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS IN BANGLADESH: EXPLORING
THE PHENOMENON OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AS A
MEANS OF MAINTAINING POWER
M. Ehteshamul Bari*
ABSTRACT
When the South Asian nation of Bangladesh emerged as an independent
nation on December 16, 1971, the founding fathers sought to establish a liberal
democracy that would uphold the rule of law and the fundamental human rights
of individuals. To this end, they incorporated extensive guarantees, including
safeguarding the enforcement of an impressive eighteen fundamental rights, in
the Constitution of Bangladesh of 1972. However, this Article will demonstrate
that after almost fifty years of independence, the promise of a liberal democracy
has remained elusive in Bangladesh due to the frequent violation of human
rights through extrajudicial killings as a convenient means of maintaining
power. Although successive governments have resorted to extrajudicial killings,
the current government of the Bangladesh Awami League, which has ruled the
nation uninterruptedly for the past twelve and a half years, has gone further than
all previous governments in resorting to such killings to suppress any threat to
its aspiration of perpetuating power. The regime’s contempt for the human
rights of individuals is further evident from the fact that even during the COVID19 pandemic, it has not shied away from resorting to extrajudicial killings to put
down its adversaries. This Article will put forward recommendations for
ensuring the realization of the elusive promise of a liberal democracy on which
the nation was founded.
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INTRODUCTION
Extrajudicial killings refer to
killings by government officials without due process of law. They
include murders by private groups if instigated by the government.
These killings may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive
use of lethal force by the police, security forces, or other agents of the
state whether against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners, or
others.”1

Therefore, it is evident that extrajudicial killings are perpetrated outside the
purview of law. In this context, the observations of the Supreme Court of
Pakistan in the case of Benazir Bhutto v. the President of Pakistan2 are
noteworthy: “[extrajudicial killings]. . . . ha[ve] no sanction or permission under
the law or . . . cannot be covered or defended under any provision of law.”3
It is further apparent that extrajudicial killing, paradoxically, involves
arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of the right to life—the most fundamental
human right of individuals.4 Indeed, the protection of other rights will be
rendered meaningless if effective measures are not put in place for safeguarding
the right to life.5 Accordingly, international human rights norms, which find
expression in a variety of regional and international human rights instruments,
such as the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the American Convention on Human
Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, all identify the
right to life as being non-derogable.6 In light of the fundamental values protected
1
Udi Sommer & Victor Asal, Examining extrajudicial killings: discriminant analyses of human rights
violations, 12 DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT, 185, 185-86 (2019).
2
Bhutto v. President of Pakistan, (1998) PLD (SC) 388, 392 (Pak.).
3
Id.
4
MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: ICCPR COMMENTARY 121 (2d
ed. 2005); Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 114–15 (1981).
5
Id.
6
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, opened
for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) art. 6, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976); American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, opened for signature 22 November 1969, 1144
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by the right to life, it has attained the status of jus cogens.7 Such recognition of
the right in turn places an obligation on states parties to ensure its continuous
operation even in the event of a grave emergency.8 The jurisprudence emerging
from the international monitoring bodies’ interpretation of the right to life
suggests that its guarantee in the domestic context has the salutary effect of
imposing both negative and positive duties on the state apparatus.9 The negative
duty involves refraining from the “intentional and unlawful taking of life” while
the positive duty entails implementing appropriate measures to “safeguard the
lives” of citizens.10 Thus, it follows that when state actors carry out extrajudicial
killings, they violate both domestic and international standards guaranteeing the
right of individuals to be free from arbitrary deprivation of life.
However, notwithstanding the adverse impact of extrajudicial killings on the
most fundamental human right of individuals—namely, the right to life—such
killings have become a convenient tool for oppressive governments around the
globe to eliminate real or perceived enemies, thereby perpetuating their grip on
power.11 The origin of the use of extrajudicial killing can be traced back to Adolf
Hitler’s tyrannical rule in Germany.12 Hitler resorted to it as the most effective
means of eliminating anyone perceived to be a threat to his desire to establish an
absolute dictatorship.13 After ascending to the office of the Chancellor in January
1933,14 Hitler ordered the SS guards, who were his “political soldiers,”15 to
execute hundreds of his political opponents—including the top leadership of
Sturmabteilung, a paramilitary organization which played a pivotal role in his
rise to power and which, according to him, “had [now] become too powerful.”16
Hitler’s resort to extrajudicial killings as the most convenient means of

U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
7
JAIME ORAÁ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (1992).
8
CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: RULES FOR GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 135 (2005).
9
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (Act No. 43/2006) § 9 (Austl.).
10
Id.
11
Edy Kaufman & Patricia Weiss Fagen, Extrajudicial Executions: An Insight into the Global Dimension
of a Human Rights Violation, 3 HUM. RTS. Q. 81, 81 (1981).
12
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, Now You See, Now You Don’t - The State’s Duty to Punish
Disappearances and Extra-Judicial Executions, 2002 AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 176, 181 (2002).
13
Id. at 179–80.
14
Wilfred Knapp et al., Adolf Hitler, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.britannica.com/
biography/Adolf-Hitler.
15
See EDS. OF THE ENCYC. BRITANNICA, SS, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.
britannica.com/topic/SS.
16
EDS. OF THE ENCYC. BRITANNICA, Night of the Long Knives, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (May 16, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Night-of-the-Long-Knives.
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suppressing political adversaries in turn persuaded strongman leaders around the
world to frequently resort to the tool.17
For instance, in Indonesia, extrajudicial killing was used in the 1960s to
annihilate communists following the infamous coup attempt of September
1965.18 In September 1965, a group of disgruntled leftist officers of the army
staged a coup in collaboration with some leaders of the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI)19—then the largest political party in the country.20 However, the
coup was short-lived.21 The army under the leadership of General Suharto
crushed the coup within a few days of its inception.22 Notwithstanding this, the
army continued to blame the PKI for the coup and launched a violent campaign
to eliminate PKI members and sympathizers.23 In the nine months between
October 1965 and June 1966, a staggering 500,000 individuals were allegedly
killed extrajudicially.24 The systematic annihilation of the largest political party
of the country ultimately paved the way for General Suharto to seize power in
March 1966.25
In the same vein, in the 1970s, the military regimes of six South American
nations—namely, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Brazil—
hatched a secret plan to violently put down their “left-wing” political
adversaries.26 This clandestine operation, called “Operation Condor,” involved
the intelligence agencies of these six nations not only sharing information with
each other, but also coordinating with each other in kidnapping and executing
the opponents of their leadership.27 During Operation Condor, it is estimated that
at least 60,000 individuals were killed extrajudicially.28
17

Maogoto, supra note 12.
EDS. OF THE ENCYC. BRITANNICA, September 30th Movement, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://www.britannica.com/event/September-30th-Movement.
19
EDS. OF THE ENCYC. BRITANNICA, Suharto, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (June 4, 2021), https://www.
britannica.com/biography/Suharto.
20
Donald Hindley, President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication, 56 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 915, 915 (1962).
21
Willard A. Hanna et al., Sukarno, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
biography/Sukarno#ref6966
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Hannah Beech, US Stood By as Indonesia Killed a Half-Million People, Paper Shows, N.Y. TIMES
(May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/world/asia/indonesia-cables-communist-massacres.html.
25
Id.
26
Erin Creegan, Criminalizing Extrajudicial Killings, 41 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 185, 190 (2013);
Larry Rohter, Exposing the Legacy of Operation Condor, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2014), https://lens.blogs.nytimes.
com/2014/01/24/exposing-the-legacy-of-operation-condor.
27
Id.
28
Id.
18
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Similarly, in Nepal, during the civil war from 1996 to 2006, both the
Government and Maoist insurgents resorted to extrajudicial killings.29
Approximately 17,000 individuals were killed during this period.30 The
government forces used such killing to “break the backbone” of the rebellion
while the Maoists used it to put down anyone who opposed their desire of
instituting a communist state.31 Notwithstanding the cessation of the conflict in
2006 following the conclusion of a peace agreement, security forces in Nepal
continue to extrajudicially kill dissidents with impunity.32
In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte’s administration, under the
guise of the so-called “war on drugs[,]” has extrajudicially killed at least 27,000
individuals since July 2016.33 This number not only includes alleged drug
peddlers but also Duterte’s adversaries, such as political activists and human
rights defenders.34 Duterte’s utter disregard for human life can be further
gathered from his comments made in 2016: “Hitler massacred three million
Jews. Now there are three million drug addicts . . . I’d be happy to slaughter
them.”35
In light of the above discussion, it can be argued that extrajudicial killings
are primarily prevalent in nations where a firm commitment to democratic
values, such as respect for the rule of law and the fundamental human rights of
individuals, are wanting among executives. In the same vein, the desire of
succeeding generations of executives in the South Asian nation of Bangladesh,
particularly the current government of Bangladesh Awami League (BAL), to
maintain their grip on power has persuaded them to resort to various arbitrary
measures, such as indiscriminate extrajudicial killing. This has in turn instilled
fear in the civilian population and, consequently, forced them into silence.

29
Shirish B. Pradhan, Nepal’s Prachanda Says He Can Be Blamed for Only 5000 Deaths During Civil
War, OUTLOOK (Jan. 15, 2020, 7:57 PM), https://www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/nepals-prachanda-says-hecan-be-blamed-for-only-5000-deaths-during-civil-war/1709296.
30
Id.
31
See Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Civilians Struggle to Survive in Nepal’s Civil War, 16 HUM.
RTS. WATCH 12(c) (Oct. 6, 2004), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nepal1004.pdf.
32
No Law, No Justice, No State for Victims: The Culture of Impunity in Post-Conflict Nepal, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/11/20/no-law-no-justice-no-state-victims/cultureimpunity-post-conflict-nepal.
33
World Report 2020: Philippines, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/
country-chapters/philippines (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
34
Nick Aspinwall, The Killings in the Philippines Grow More Brazen, INTERPRETER (Aug. 25, 2020,
11:00 AM), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/killings-philippines-grow-more-brazen.
35
Clifford Coonan, 10 Quotes: Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte in his Own Words, IRISH TIMES
(Sept. 30, 2016, 4:55 PM), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/10-quotes-philippines-presidentrodrigo-duterte-in-his-own-words-1.2812189.
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Needless to say, the resort to such indiscriminate killings contravenes the
democratic values on which Bangladesh was founded.36
When Bangladesh was in a union with Pakistan as its Eastern Province from
1947 to 1971, Bangladeshis frequently witnessed the systematic subversion of
the rule of law and experienced routine violations of their fundamental human
rights at the hands of the Pakistani military junta.37 Consequently, the desire to
institute a society based on the rule of law and human rights, among other things,
persuaded Bangladeshis to wage a war of independence against the Pakistani
military on March 26, 1971.38 Bangladesh ultimately secured its independence
from Pakistan on December 16, 1971, following a brutal nine-month-long war.39
Subsequently, the founding fathers of Bangladesh sought to give effect to the
aspiration of the inhabitants of the newly-formed nation by stipulating a number
of guarantees in the Constitution of Bangladesh, which entered into force on
December 16, 1972.40 This included the guarantee of as many as eighteen
fundamental rights, including the right to life.41
Against this backdrop, this Article will first trace the evolutionary history of
extrajudicial killings in the Indo-Pak-Bangladesh Subcontinent. The objective
underlying this discussion is to make it evident that extrajudicial killing began
to be used in the Subcontinent as an effective means of eliminating adversaries.
Second, light will be shed on the guarantees enumerated in the Constitution of
Bangladesh to establish a liberal democracy in which the fundamental human
rights of individuals will be promoted and protected. Third, this Article will
demonstrate that shortly after independence, the government of the BAL
resorted to extrajudicial killings for the first time to violently put down its
political adversaries, in contravention of the guarantees contained in the
Constitution. Fourth, light will be shed on the extrajudicial killings which
occurred between 1982 and 1990 to ensure the survival of the autocratic regime
of General H.M. Ershad. Fifth, it will be shown that after a brief period of
stability, there was a re-emergence of this disturbing practice between October
16, 2003 and January 9, 2004, when the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)
was in office, and again during the term of the army-backed, Non-Party “Caretaker” Government from January 2007 to December 2008. Finally, light will be

36
CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGL., Nov. 4, 1972, pmbl.; M. EHTESHAMUL BARI,
STATES OF EMERGENCY AND THE LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF BANGLADESH 7 (2017).
37
BARI, supra note 36, at 8.
38
CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGL., Nov. 4, 1972, pmbl.
39
See BARI, supra note 36, at 7.
40
CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGL., Nov. 4, 1972, arts. 27–44.
41
Id.
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shed on the manner in which the current ruling party, the BAL, has used
extrajudicial killings for the past twelve and a half years as an effective means
of obviating the possibility of any popular resistance to its perpetuation of
power. Consequently, this Article will put forward concrete recommendations
for promoting and protecting the democratic ideals on which Bangladesh was
founded.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE USE OF EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS IN THE INDOPAK-BANGLADESH SUBCONTINENT

The origins of the use of extrajudicial killings in the Indian Subcontinent can
be traced back to British rule. During its one hundred years of formal rule in the
Subcontinent, the British frequently resorted to extrajudicial killings to quell
“nationalist and revolutionary movements of Indians.”42 For instance, on April
13, 1919, thousands gathered at Jallianwala Bagh—a garden in the city of
Amritsar—to protest the enactment of the draconian Anarchical and
Revolutionary Crimes Act,43 popularly known as the Rowlatt Act.44 The Rowlatt
Act authorized the Colonial Government to exercise the extraordinary power of
preventive detention without the precondition of a state of emergency.
Consequently, the Act was used to detain Indians who were suspected of being
involved in “anarchical and revolutionary movements” against the colonial
government.45 Although the protesters gathered at Jallianwala Bagh were
unarmed, the British troops under the command of Brigadier-General Reginald
Dyer opened fire on them, killing at least 379 individuals.46 However, the Indian
freedom movement leaders estimated that the number of those killed was even
higher. They claimed approximately 1000 were killed.47 However, the
Jallianwala Bagh Massacre did not yield the desired effect for the Colonial
Government. Instead, the extrajudicial executions of so many unarmed
protesters galvanized the Indian nationalist leaders in the struggle for freedom
from British rule.48

42
BARI, supra note 36, at 100; Shamil Shams, The Jallianwala Massacre—When British Troops Killed
Hundreds of Unarmed Indians, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.dw.com/en/the-jallianwalamassacre-when-british-troops-killed-hundreds-of-unarmed-indians/a-48313295.
43
Shams, supra note 42.
44
BARI, supra note 36, at 100.
45
Id.
46
Shams, supra note 42.
47
Id.
48
Jallianwala: How 1,650 Bullets Changed Course of India’s Freedom Struggle, TIMES INDIA (Feb. 12,
2020, 4:42 PM), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jallianwala-bagh-massacre-how-1650-bullets-changed-thecourse-of-indias-freedom-struggle/articleshow/68752809.cms.
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The Indian Subcontinent ultimately secured its independence from colonial
rule on August 15, 1947, when the Indian Independence Act, which was passed
by the British Parliament on July 18, 1947, came into effect.49 The imperial
legislation partitioned the Subcontinent into two independent states—India and
Pakistan. Pakistan was then composed of two geographically and culturally
distant provinces of West Pakistan and East Pakistan.50 Twenty-four years later,
the eastern wing of Pakistan emerged as an independent nation in December
1971.51
A. Extrajudicial Killing in Postcolonial India
Although Indians termed the British use of extrajudicial killings during the
colonial rule as “morally indefensible,”52 it is indeed ironic that following
decolonization, successive governments in India have resorted to this heinous
tool to crush, among other things, separatist movements. For instance, the Indian
Security Forces extrajudicially killed 8257 individuals in the state of Punjab
between 1984 and 1995 to supress the demand for a separate homeland for
Sikhs.53 Furthermore, in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the security forces
extrajudicially killed thousands of Kashmiris in an attempt to put down their
movement for self-determination.54 According to one estimation, at least 70,000
individuals have lost their lives since 1989, when rebels began resisting the
Indian occupation of Kashmir.55 Paradoxically, this number not only includes
suspected militants, but also innocent civilians. For instance, in 2020, the
security forces extrajudicially killed “at least 65 civilians.”56 However, these
killings have frequently been justified by succeeding generations of executives
as “encounter killings,” thereby implying that these individuals were killed
during armed clashes with the security forces.57

49

Indian Independence Act 1947 (India) § 1(1) (UK).
Id.; BARI, supra note 36, at 32.
51
BARI, supra note 36, at 32.
52
Shams, supra note 42.
53
Rashme Sehgal, Uncovering Extra-Judicial Killings in Punjab, and the Police Impunity that Followed,
WIRE (Dec. 16, 2017), https://thewire.in/politics/uncovering-widespread-extra-judicial-killings-punjab-policeimpunity-came.
54
Kashmir: 5 Security Forces and 2 Rebels Killed in a Gun Battle, AL JAZEERA (May 3, 2020), https://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/3/kashmir-5-security-forces-and-2-rebels-killed-in-a-gun-battle.
55
Id.
56
Kashmir: 225 Militants, 60 Security Men Killed in 2020, ANADOLU AGENCY (Dec. 31, 2020), https://
www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/kashmir-225-militants-60-security-men-killed-in-2020/2095249.
57
India: New Reports of Extrajudicial Killings in Kashmir, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 14, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/14/india-new-reports-extrajudicial-killings-kashmir.
50
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These issues are further exacerbated by the fact that the security forces have
carried out such executions in Punjab and J&K with impunity. The Indian Code
of Criminal Procedure precludes courts from recognizing any offenses officials
may commit while carrying out their duties without the prior approval of the
central or state government.58 This has been supplemented with the enactment
of region-specific legislation. For instance, the Armed Forces (Punjab and
Chandigarh) Special Powers Act and the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir)
Special Powers Act not only confer extensive powers on the armed forces to deal
with secessionists, but also seek to protect security forces from prosecution.59
Since the enactment of these laws, successive governments have refused to
prosecute members of the security forces, notwithstanding credible evidence of
their involvement in extrajudicial executions.60 This is notwithstanding the
observations of the Supreme Court of India in two landmark cases since 2013.
In the 2013 case of Suresh Singh v. Union of India,61 the Supreme Court
forcefully denounced the government’s attempt to justify extrajudicial killings
when it observed:
For this Court, the life of a policeman or a member of the security
forces is no less precious and valuable than any other person. The lives
lost in the fight against terrorism and insurgency are indeed the most
grievous loss. But to the State it is not open to cite the numbers of
policemen and security forces killed to justify custodial death, fake
encounter or what this Court called “Administrative liquidation”. It is
simply not permitted by the Constitution. And in a situation where the
Court finds a person’s rights, especially the right to life under assault
by the State or agencies of the State, it must step in and stand with the
individual and prohibit the State or its agencies from violating the
rights guaranteed under the Constitution. That is the role of this Court
and it would perform it under all circumstances.62

In the same vein, three years later the Supreme Court opined in Extra Judicial
Execution Victim Families Association v. Union of India that:
It does not matter whether the victim was a common person or a
militant or a terrorist, nor does it matter whether the aggressor was a
58

Code Crim. Pro. India, 1973, § 197 (India).
Both the acts state, “No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the
previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be
done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act.” Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers
Act, 1983, § 7; Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, § 7 (India).
60
India: New Reports of Extrajudicial Killings in Kashmir, supra note 57.
61
Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association v. Union of India, Unreported Judgments Writ
Petition (Criminal)/No. 129 of 2012, decided on January 4, 2013 (SC).
62
Id. ¶ 6.
59
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common person or the state. The law is the same for both and is equally
applicable to both . . . . This is the requirement of a democracy and the
requirement of preservation of the rule of law and the preservation of
individual liberties.63

B. Extrajudicial Killing in Postcolonial Pakistan
The union between the West and East Provinces of Pakistan, which were
“separated by more than 1,000 miles of Indian territory[,]”64 was short-lived.
Since the very inception of the union, the real power and influence in the newly
established nation was wielded by the Punjab-dominated federal government in
the western wing. The tendency of the western wing to centralize power led an
East Pakistani lawmaker to note that:
After the achievement of freedom there had been . . . centralisation
of power . . . in the central government of Pakistan. I consider it to
be the most unsound and short-sighted policy. The province[] [of
East Pakistan] must be allowed to enjoy the full autonomous
position, must be as free from central government as it is thought
practical.65
Such centralization, in turn, resulted in the inhabitants of the western wing
asserting supremacy over their eastern counterpart “in every sphere of
governmental and public activity.”66 In this context, the observations of Paul
Dreyfust are noteworthy: “Over the years, West Pakistan behaved like a poorly
raised, egotistical guest, devouring the best dishes and leaving nothing but scraps
and leftovers for East Pakistan.”67 Consequently, in an effort to prevent the
eastern wing’s reduction to a “mere colony of West Pakistan,”68 the Awami
League, under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), proposed the
implementation of a Six-Point Program (Program) in March 1966, which was
termed the “charter of survival” for East Pakistanis.69
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The idea underlying the Program was to secure meaningful provincial
autonomy for East Pakistan and to “foster [a] durable relationship between the
two provinces.”70 When Ayub Khan, who assumed the office of President of
Pakistan on October 27, 1958, following a Proclamation of Martial Law,71 did
not pay any heed to the Program, the idea of securing greater provincial
autonomy for East Pakistan and safeguarding the interests of East Pakistanis
became the cornerstone of the Awami League’s election platform in 1970.72 In
the first general election in Pakistan’s history, held on December 7, 1970, the
Awami League emerged as the majority party, winning 167 of 313 parliamentary
seats.73 However, instead of inviting Mujib to form a national government, the
military junta “postponed the convening of the National Assembly, sine die” on
March 1, 1971.74 This indiscriminate move incensed the East Pakistanis and
galvanized a “massive movement of civil disobedience” in the province.75
However, the military junta labeled the popular movement as an “armed
rebellion” and launched the genocidal “Operation Searchlight” to crush the
movement.76 This led East Pakistan to proclaim its independence as the
sovereign nation of Bangladesh on March 26, 1971.77
The Pakistani military crackdown in Bangladesh involved the abduction and
extrajudicial execution of several thousand political opponents and
distinguished intellectuals.78 The manner in which these killings were carried
out bore the hallmarks of the manner in which Hitler had systematically
annihilated any opposition to his rule.79 Bengali dissidents and intellectuals were
also abducted and subsequently tortured to death by paramilitary forces—
namely, Al-Badr (the moon) and Al-Shams (the sun)—established by the
Pakistani military junta.80 It is widely believed that these killings were carried
out to not only terrorize the Bengali population into obedience, but also to
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deprive the Bengali nation of the benefits of the wisdom and contributions of
enlightened minds.81
Despite the brutality inflicted on the Bengali population, on December 16,
1971, the Bengalis ultimately emerged victorious in their war of independence
against Pakistan.82 However, it seems that Pakistan’s ruling elite has not learned
any lesson from its use of arbitrary measures, such as extrajudicial killing.
Although such measures ultimately led the eastern wing of the nation to break
away as a separate nation, successive governments in Pakistan have authorized
the security forces to continue to use extrajudicial killings to terrorize its own
population and suppress their demands. In this context, reference can be made
to the extrajudicial killing of thousands of inhabitants of Balochistan—
Pakistan’s largest province which is rich in natural resources—to crush their
movement for provincial autonomy and demand for a greater share of the natural
resources of the province.83 Those killed include academics, political activists,
human rights activists, journalists, and students.84
Thus, although the inhabitants of the Indian Subcontinent had strong
reservations about the colonial government’s use of extrajudicial killing to quell
their nationalist movements, their governments, upon independence, have
resorted to the same arbitrary tool to suppress their citizens’ legitimate demands
with impunity. In this context, the observations of Alan Gledhill are pertinent:
“All previous Indian governments have been despotic, and the main Indian
objection to the rule which ceased in 1947 was not that it was despotic, but that
it was British.”85
II. THE CONSTITUTION OF BANGLADESH AND THE GUARANTEES OF A
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
Following the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation, the
founding fathers made the conscious effort to give effect to the long-cherished
aspiration of Bangladeshis to be part of a liberal democracy.86 Accordingly, they
endeavored to institute a society based on the three pillars of democracy, rule of
81
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law, and fundamental liberties, to avoid the traumatic experiences of the past
union with Pakistan. This is evident from the preamble of the Constitution of
Bangladesh:
it shall be a fundamental aim of the State to realise through the
democratic process a socialist society, free from exploitation—a
society in which the rule of law, fundamental human rights and
freedom, equality and justice . . . will be secured for all citizens[.]87

Furthermore, the Constitution stipulates that respect for “fundamental human
rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of the human person”
shall be one of the Fundamental Principles of State Policy.88 This shall be
“fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh, . . . applied by the State in the
making of laws, . . . a guide to the interpretation of the Constitution and of the
other laws of Bangladesh, and shall form the basis of the work of the state and
of its citizens.”89 Hence, the Constitution, as the supreme law of Bangladesh,
imposes an obligation on the state to ensure that its laws and policies respect the
rights and dignity of individuals.
To complement the above guarantees, the Constitution safeguards the
enjoyment of as many as eighteen fundamental rights.90 Since “the enjoyment
of the right to life is a necessary condition of the enjoyment of all other human
rights[,]”91 it has found a prominent place in the Constitution. Article 32 of the
Constitution provides: “No person shall be deprived of life . . . save in
accordance with law.”92 Thus, the Constitution imposes an obligation on the
state to protect citizens from arbitrary deprivation of life. Furthermore, Article
35(3) stipulates that anyone suspected of committing an offense “shall have the
right to a speedy and public trial by an independent and impartial court or
tribunal established by law[,]” thereby guaranteeing the right of the accused to
have his day in the court to contest the charges brought against him and to be
punished only after a guilty verdict is pronounced against him.93 It can be argued
that the cumulative effect of these guarantees in the Constitution is to prevent
security forces from arbitrarily encroaching on the right to life of a suspect as
judge, jury, and executioner in contravention of due process of law.
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In this context, the observations of the Supreme Court of India about the
right to life are noteworthy. Specifically, the right to life receives constitutional
protection in India under the same language as in the Constitution of
Bangladesh. In the 2009 case of Ramesbhai Chandubhai Rathod v. State of
Gujarat, the court noted: “fairness, justice and reasonableness [] constitute the
essence of guarantee of life . . . epitomized in . . . the Constitution . . . .”94
III. EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS DURING THE REGIME OF MUJIB
A. The Reign of Mujib
Despite the extensive guarantees, as discussed in Part II, incorporated into
the Constitution of Bangladesh to institute a liberal democracy, these guarantees
were soon discarded to cement Mujib’s grip on power. Although Mujib enjoyed
tremendous popular support when he ascended to the office of Prime Minister
on January 11, 1972, his ineffectiveness in curbing “rapid inflation, food
shortages, famine, smuggling[,] . . . black-marketeering[,]” and widespread
corruption among his party members adversely impacted the lives of millions in
the nascent nation.95 Consequently, the nation witnessed the rise of two extreme
leftist political parties, namely, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist
Party) and Sarbohara (Proletariat) Party. These parties resorted to violent means
in an attempt to overthrow the government of Mujib.96 In response, Mujib
unleashed a reign of terror. He deployed the Jatiya Rakhkhi Bahini (JRB)
(National Defense Force)—a paramilitary force consisting of 25,000 men drawn
from the BAL who had sworn an oath of allegiance not to the state or the
Constitution, but rather to Mujib—to stage a crackdown on his opponents.97 It
is estimated that during Mujib’s rule, the JRB and other security forces
extrajudicially killed thousands of individuals who either opposed or were
suspected of opposing Mujib.98
However, notwithstanding the lawless manner in which the JRB was
operating, the High Court Division (HCD) of the Supreme Court (the highest
94
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court in Bangladesh) intervened, in proper exercise of its constitutional duty, to
prevent arbitrary encroachment on the liberty of individuals. The HCD
forcefully observed in early 1974, while considering a writ petition for habeas
corpus challenging the actions taken by the JRB, that: “the Rakkhi Bahini’s
methods of operation have shown a complete disrespect for the procedural
reforms as are enjoined by the Constitution as well as by the general law of the
country.”99 It is striking that instead of directing the JRB to cease and desist its
unconstitutional actions, Mujib proceeded to enable the JRB to act in an
unconstrained manner. He persuaded the Parliament to enact the Jatiya Rakkhi
Bahini (Amendment) Act, which granted total immunity to the members of JRB
from prosecution and legal proceedings.100 However, since the HCD’s power to
enforce the fundamental rights of individuals stems from the Constitution
itself,101 the HCD continued to take notice of the human rights violations
perpetrated by the JRB. For instance, in August 1974, the HCD held that the
measures taken by the JRB in putting down Mujib’s political rivals were “illegal,
ultra vires, and prejudicial to the fundamental rights ensured in the
Constitution.”102
However, Mujib’s response to the judiciary acting independently to hold his
private army accountable was akin to that of an absolute dictator. On December
28, 1974, in an attempt to remove the checks on his powers, Mujib persuaded
the President (the nominal head of state) to proclaim an emergency on the
imprecise ground of internal disturbance, pursuant to Article 141A(1) of the
Constitution.103 On the same day as the proclamation of emergency, a
presidential order was issued, suspending the enforcement of twelve of the
eighteen fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. This included the
right to life and the right to petition the Supreme Court for enforcement of the
fundamental rights.104 Arguably, this order was issued to remove the
constitutional obligation of the government of Mujib to respect “fundamental
human rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of the human
person.”105 Consequently, only four days into the suspension of the enforcement
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of the fundamental rights, the JRB extrajudicially executed Siraj Sikder—the
head of Sarbohara Party.106
On January 25, 1975, twenty-three days after Sikder’s killing, Mujib used
the overwhelming majority of the BAL to insert the Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act into the Constitution to formally complete Bangladesh’s
transformation from a liberal democracy to an absolute dictatorship.107 This
amendment substituted parliamentary democracy, which was introduced in
Bangladesh within a month of the nation securing independence from Pakistan
to realize the “aspiration of the people[,]”108 with a presidential form of
government. The amendment prescribed a “direct election” for the office of the
President.109 Paradoxically, the amendment did not envisage any such election
for Mujib. Rather, it proclaimed that Mujib “shall become, and enter upon the
office of President of Bangladesh and shall, as from such commencement, hold
office as President of Bangladesh as if elected to that office under the
Constitution as amended by this Act.”110
To enable the newly anointed President Mujib to act in an unconstrained
manner, the Fourth Amendment dispensed with the traditional checks and
balances which underpinned the system of government originally envisaged by
the Constitution. For instance, the Amendment diminished the competence of
Parliament to impeach the President on account of violating the Constitution,
grave misconduct, or physical or mental incapacity.111 Any motion to impeach
or remove the President under the Constitution, as amended by the Fourth
Amendment, required the support of at least three-fourths of the Members of
Parliament (MPs) to be passed.112 Thus, the President required a stringent
procedure for impeachment or removal, whereas any provision of the
Constitution can be amended with the support of a mere two-thirds of MPs.113
Furthermore, since Mujib’s party commanded the support of 293 of the 300
MPs,114 the opposition could never muster the necessary numbers to either
impeach or remove him.
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To further enable President Mujib to assert supremacy over the legislative
branch, the Constitution, as amended by the Fourth Amendment, granted Mujib
the power to withhold assent from any bill passed by the Parliament.115 Hence,
the amendment essentially invested Mujib with veto power.
Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment eroded the independence of the
judiciary by changing the method of appointing and removing the justices of the
Supreme Court. It conferred on the President the power to appoint the justices
of the Supreme Court without needing to consult the Chief Justice of
Bangladesh, who is better poised than the political branches of the government
to know whether a lawyer or a judicial officer merits an appointment to the
bench.116 Furthermore, the President was granted the power to remove the
justices from office on the ground of misbehavior or incapacity.117 Thus, Mujib
was entrusted with the unfettered power to decide the fate of the justices of the
highest court of law, thereby impeding its competence to hold him accountable
for his actions.
Finally, the Fourth Amendment empowered Mujib to declare Bangladesh a
one-party state—a power which he exercised within a month of the enactment
of the amendment.118 This fundamentally changed the political landscape of the
nation. The introduction of a single national party—the Bangladesh Krishak
Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL) (the Bangladesh Peasants and Workers
National Party)—resulted in the enforced dissolution of all other political parties
in the country.119 The Constitution of the BAKSAL, which was issued on June
6, 1975, stipulated that no one could contest an election either to the Parliament
or to the office of the President unless nominated by the BAKSAL.120
The removal of checks and balances further emboldened security forces,
including the JRB, to systematically crush Mujib’s opposition using arbitrary
tools, such as extrajudicial killings. The contempt of Mujib—once “an ardent
supporter of liberal democracy”121—towards the most fundamental human right
of individuals was manifestly apparent in his speech made to the Parliament on
the very day of the enactment of the Fourth Amendment. He remarked: “Where
of Bangladesh into Tyranny Following the Non-Participatory General Election of 2014: A Critical Appraisal,
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115
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is Siraj Sikder today?”122 It seems this remark was aimed at sending a stern
warning to those who opposed Mujib, i.e., they would suffer the same fate as
Sikder if they continued their opposition. Thus, only a few years after gaining
independence from Pakistan, Mujib began to use extrajudicial killings to create
a climate of fear and intimidation among the population, thereby taking the
nation back to the days of despotism.
B. The Fall of Mujib and the Aftermath
Mujib’s transformation of Bangladesh into a one-party dictatorship
ultimately persuaded a group of junior army officers to take the drastic step of
carrying out a coup d’état. On August 15, 1975, these army officers assassinated
Mujib and a majority of his immediate family members.123 The assassination
was followed by the imposition of martial law throughout the country.124
However, the constant jostle for power within the army ranks led to a series of
coups and counter-coups in the months following the declaration of martial
law.125 Although some degree of political stability was restored after the
government of Major General Ziaur Rahman (Zia) initiated the electoral process
and withdrew martial law on April 6, 1979,126 this was also short-lived. Zia, too,
was assassinated by a group of army officers on May 30, 1981.127
IV. EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS DURING ERSHAD’S RULE
A. The Reign of Ershad
Lieutenant General H.M. Ershad, then the Chief of Army Staff, emerged as
the direct beneficiary of the abortive coup that assassinated Zia.128 Although
Ershad initially ruled out the possibility of imposing martial law on the plea that
it would be counterproductive to fostering democracy in the country, he had a
complete change of heart within a few months.129 On March 24, 1982, Ershad
executed a bloodless coup to overthrow the democratically elected government
of the BNP—the party founded by Zia—and declared martial law throughout
122
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the nation for the second time in its history.130 Ironically, contrary to his earlier
assertions, Ershad now claimed that a martial law regime was necessary to
institute a healthy “democratic system which [would] ensure that power really
rests with the people.”131 However, the actions he took after assuming power
exposed that he was merely paying lip service to the idea of instituting a “healthy
democratic system.”132
In an effort to consolidate power, Ershad formed his own political party, the
Jatiya Party (JP), by raiding the ranks of the BAL and BNP and subsequently
presided over three sham elections—one presidential and two parliamentary.133
Alarmed at the prospect of Bangladesh being turned into a “garrison state,”134
Sheikh Hasina (Mujib’s daughter who became the Chief of the BAL in 1981135)
and Begum Khaleda Zia (Zia’s widow who was elected the Chairperson of the
BNP in May 1984136) announced on October 28, 1987, a comprehensive
program to force Ershad out of office.137 Consequently, during November 1987,
thousands of opposition supporters took to the streets demanding Ershad’s
resignation.138 However, to preserve his grip on power, Ershad staged a massive
crackdown on the opposition, issuing “shoot on sight” orders to members of law
enforcement agencies to restore law and order.139 Furthermore, in the same
manner as Mujib, on November 27, 1987, Ershad also proclaimed an emergency
on the nebulous ground of internal disturbance to fend off the threats posed to
his rule.140 The declaration of emergency was followed by a presidential order
suspending the enforcement of the same twelve fundamental rights that had been
suspended by Mujib.141 Consequently, it is estimated that by early 1988, the
security forces extrajudicially killed as many as thirty-eight people to crush the
movement to depose Ershad.142
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Although the adoption of these repressive measures allowed Ershad to
maintain his grip on power, he managed to alienate every section of society by
systematically dismantling all democratic avenues for the expression of dissent
and by depriving them of the opportunity to elect a government of their choice
through free, fair, and credible elections.143 The opposing political parties
ultimately capitalized on popular discontent in October 1990 when they
launched yet another movement to force Ershad out of office.144 Ershad’s
response was once again to deploy security forces to indiscriminately kill the
opposing political activists. For instance, during an opposition demonstration on
October 10, 1990, security forces extrajudicially killed “several people.”145 A
month later, Ershad’s gunmen killed Shamsul Alam Khan Milon, a medical
practitioner and Joint Secretary of the Bangladesh Medical Association, on the
campus of the University of Dhaka.146 His killing sparked a massive civil
disobedience movement.147 Ershad thought he could crush the movement by
proclaiming yet another emergency on the ground of internal disturbance.148
However, Ershad misread the magnitude of the discontent against him. The
proclamation of emergency and consequent restrictions did not have the desired
impact of persuading people to put an end to their movement.149 Ultimately,
Ershad bowed down to popular demand and resigned from office on December
6, 1990.150
It is, therefore, evident that in the first two decades after securing
independence from Pakistan, successive generations of executives in
Bangladesh merely paid lip service to the idea of upholding the fundamental
human rights of individuals. They routinely resorted to arbitrary measures, such
as extrajudicial killing, to put down anyone considered a threat to their desire of
maintaining a stranglehold on power.
B. The General Election of 1991 and the Restoration of Parliamentary
Democracy in Bangladesh
Following Ershad’s resignation, an extraconstitutional, neutral caretaker
government was formed with Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed as its head.151
143
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This caretaker government, in fulfillment of its mandate, assisted the Election
Commission in conducting a free and fair general election on February 27,
1991.152 In the election, the BNP won 140 out of the 300 parliamentary seats and
subsequently masterminded the simple majority required to form a government
with the support of the Jamaat-e-Islami—a party that won eighteen
parliamentary seats.153 Subsequently, the newly elected Parliament unanimously
passed the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1991, which reintroduced
parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh nearly seventeen years after it had been
discarded by Mujib in favor of a presidential form of government.154 The resolve
shown by the political parties in Bangladesh to restore democracy gave rise to
the hope that the democratic ideals on which the nation was founded would
finally be realized. In fact, in the decade following the historic general election
of 1991, the fundamental human rights of Bangladeshi citizens were not violated
through state-sponsored extrajudicial killings. However, all this changed with
the return of the BNP-led government in October 2001.
V. THE RETURN OF EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS DURING THE BNP-LED
GOVERNMENT OF 2001–2006
When the BNP returned to power in October 2001 after five years of BAL
rule, it inherited an escalating crime rate as well as the illicit proliferation of
firearms in society.155 In an effort to combat the deteriorating state of law and
order, the BNP government launched “Operation Clean Heart” (Operation)—an
operation led by the army—within a year of entering office.156 Unlike Mujib and
Ershad, the BNP government did not use the Operation as a tool to preserve its
grip on power.157 However, the Operation did have an adverse impact on the
fundamental human rights of individuals. According to one estimation, during
the Operation, the army extrajudicially killed at least fifty-seven individuals.158
Therefore, to crack down on crime, the government overlooked the fact that even
those suspected of committing flagrant crimes were entitled to fundamental
152
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rights, such as the right to freedom from arbitrary deprivation of life and the
right to have a day in court.
Amidst fierce criticism from the opposition and human rights organizations,
the BNP government ultimately announced the termination of the Operation on
January 9, 2003.159 However, within forty-six days of termination, the BNP
regime used its overwhelming majority in Parliament to pass the Joint Drive
Indemnity Act, 2003, indemnifying members of the armed forces against the
atrocities committed during the Operation.160 Thus, the BNP government had
followed in the footsteps of Mujib, who had granted immunity to members of
the JRB, in entrenching impunity in the legal system for law enforcement who
commit gross violations of fundamental human rights.
Notably, permitting law enforcement agencies to operate with impunity
encourages the continuation of practices that severely erode fundamental human
rights. This claim is bolstered by the events following the enactment of the Joint
Drive Indemnity Act. Since the Operation did not yield the desired result of
bringing down the crime rate, in March 2004 the BNP government established
the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), a paramilitary force comprised of men from
the armed forces, the police, and other law enforcement agencies.161 RAB was
entrusted with the task of combatting crime and thereby restoring law and
order.162 However, as during the Operation, RAB members indiscriminately
killed individuals suspected of committing crimes. From the commencement of
its operation in March 2004 until the BNP left office in October 2006, 991
individuals were killed extrajudicially.163 The cavalier attitude of the regime
toward these fundamental rights was manifested in the remarks of the then-State
Minister for Home Affairs: “Criminals cannot have any human rights.”164 This
attempt to normalize extrajudicial killings as an administrative necessity not
only eroded the presumption of innocence of those killed, but also stood in stark
contrast to the extensive guarantees contained in the Constitution of
Bangladesh—the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life and the right to
contest criminal charges.
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VI. EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING DURING THE EMERGENCY OF 2007
Toward the end of the BNP government’s tenure, Bangladesh plunged into
a political and constitutional crisis over the appointment of the head of the NonParty Caretaker Government (NPCG). The NPCG system was inserted into the
Constitution of Bangladesh in 1996 by the Constitution (Thirteenth
Amendment) Act in recognition of the fact that since independence, elections
held under the supervision of political governments had invariably been rigged
in favor of the incumbent.165 Thus the Constitution, as amended by the
Thirteenth Amendment Act, provided that the NPCG—led by the last retired
Chief Justice—would be formed upon the completion of a government’s fiveyear tenure. The NPCG’s principal mandate was to assist the Election
Commission in conducting a free and fair general election within ninety days of
the dissolution of Parliament.166 The Constitution, as amended by the Thirteenth
Amendment Act, further provided that NPCG would “not make any policy
decision[,]” but would rather carry out the “routine functions of such
government[.]”167
In October 2006, it was evident that Justice K.M. Hasan would be sworn in
as the Chief Adviser of the NPCG, formed to supervise the general election of
January 2007.168 Consequently, the BAL launched a violent campaign to prevent
him from assuming office.169 The BAL alleged that Justice Hasan’s past
association with the BNP would impede his competence to carry out the
functions of the NPCG’s head in an objective and impartial manner.170
The magnitude of violence perpetrated by the BAL ultimately persuaded the
army to intervene. On January 11, 2007, the President, under military pressure,
declared a state of emergency for the fifth time in the nation’s history, once again
on the vague ground of internal disturbance.171 The declaration of emergency
was followed by a presidential order suspending the enforcement of all eighteen
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, an unprecedented event
given the previous emergency regimes had only suspended the enforcement of
twelve fundamental rights.172 The army also installed its preferred candidate,
165
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Fakhruddin Ahmed, as the head of the NPCG.173 Importantly, Ahmed was
appointed without exhausting the provisions inserted in the Constitution by the
Thirteenth Amendment for the appointment of the head of the NPCG.174
Strikingly, the army-backed NPCG, in contravention of the NPCG’s
constitutional mandate to assist the Election Commission in conducting a free
and fair general election, suspended polls for an indefinite period and instead
made a number of policy decisions.175 The policy decisions included, among
other things, reconstitution of the Anti-Corruption Commission and
establishment of the National Coordination Committee on Corruption and
Serious Crime to implement its political agenda of incarcerating the top
leadership of the two major political parties—BAL and BNP—on charges of
corruption.176 The persecution of the leading politicians of the country, including
Hasina and Zia, gave rise to the fear that the army was on the verge of formally
taking the reins of the government.177 Such suspicion gained further momentum
in April 2007 when the Chief of Army, General Moeen U. Ahmed, remarked:
The roadmap to democracy lies, I presume, with objectives as
envisioned by the government . . . within [an] affordable time frame
that will steer the country away from escapism and build [a] strong
foundation of validity on democracy . . . We do not want to go back to
an “elective democracy” where corruption in society becomes all
pervasive, governance suffers in terms of insecurity and violation of
rights, and where political “criminalisation” threatens the very survival
and integrity of the state.178

Paradoxically, to obviate the possibility of any opposition to its rule, the
army-backed regime went to extraordinary lengths in establishing a reign of
terror. For instance, law enforcement agencies took undue advantage of the
suspension of enforcement of fundamental human rights, such as the right to life,
to extrajudicially execute as many as 333 individuals during the state of
emergency.179 However, the official cover-up of these indiscriminate killings
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was that they were “crossfire killings,” “gunfights,” or “encounter killings.”180
Thus, the emergency regime sought to imply that these individuals were killed
during exchanges of gunfire with members of security forces. Furthermore, to
absolve the law enforcement agencies of responsibility for these killings, the
Emergency Powers Ordinance, 2007, provided that “no action, done by a person
in good faith, according to this ordinance or any rule under this ordinance or any
provision under such rule, may be challenged in civil or criminal court.”181
To realize the army’s aspiration of formally seizing power, the NPCG, which
had the mere constitutional mandate of assisting the Election Commission in
holding a credible general election, violated the most fundamental human
right—the right to life. However, the army could not fulfill its aspiration as
foreign dignitaries, who initially played a major role in instigating the army to
intervene in the political deadlock over the appointment of the NPCG head, did
not support Bangladesh turning into a garrison state to preserve their nations’
developmental interests.182
Subsequently, the NPCG finally announced one year and eight months after
taking office that it would assist the Election Commission in conducting a
general election in December 2008.183 This announcement was followed by the
revocation of the state of emergency and the restoration of fundamental rights
on December 17, 2008.184 Hence, the people of the country were deprived of all
their rights for nearly two years due to the army’s adventurism.
In the subsequent general election, the BAL-led grand alliance secured a
landslide victory over the BNP-led alliance, winning 262 of the 300
parliamentary seats.185 The BAL’s victory gave rise to the hope that it would
ensure respect for the dignity and worth of individuals. Prior to the election, the
BAL pledged in its election manifesto—termed the “Charter for Change”—that
if elected to power it would put an end to extrajudicial killings, establish the rule
of law, and “strictly” enforce the fundamental liberties of individuals.186
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VII. POST-2009 EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING BY THE BAL REGIME
TO ESTABLISH TYRANNY
Notwithstanding the commitments made by the BAL, it soon became
apparent that the party was merely paying lip service to the idea of safeguarding
the rule of law and enjoyment of human rights. The idea of perpetuating power
at all costs began to constantly guide Prime Minister Hasina’s demeanor. To this
end, her government resorted to various arbitrary tools, such as extrajudicial
killings, to instill fear and terror in the population to deter anyone from voicing
opposition to her rule. In the twelve and a half years since the BAL assumed
power, at least 2581 individuals have been killed extrajudicially.187 Thus, the
BAL regime has gone further than all previous governments by presiding over
the extrajudicial execution of an enormous number of individuals. These killings
can be divided into three phases: 2009–2013, 2014–2018, and 2018 to the
present.
A. Extrajudicial Killings During the BAL’s Rule from January 2009 to
December 2013
The commitments made by the BAL before the general election of 2008
were reaffirmed by Prime Minister Hasina before Parliament within a month of
her assuming office in February 2009.188 She remarked that there would be no
extrajudicial killings under any circumstances.189 She further pledged that “legal
action would be taken against those guilty of such killing[s].”190 However, in
contravention of these commitments, the regime continued to use the tool,
following in the footsteps of its predecessors. Initially, extrajudicial killing was
primarily used against those suspected of crimes. Occasionally, however, the
regime used the tool to eliminate opposition activists.191 Furthermore, in the
same manner as its predecessors, the regime termed these killings as “crossfire
killings” or “encounter killings” in an attempt to shroud its actions.192
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However, there was a dramatic shift in the BAL government’s attitude by
2011. By this time, Hasina had begun to take steps calculated to perpetuate her
survival in power. To this end, she identified the NPCG system as an
impediment to implementing her parochial agenda, as the NPCG had enabled
voters to exercise their democratic rights in free and fair general elections to
elect governments truly reflective of their will.193 Consequently, citizens were
empowered by the NPCG to never reelect the incumbent party.194 Accordingly,
the BAL used its brute majority in Parliament to repeal the NPCG system on
July 3, 2011, through the enactment of the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment)
Act, 2011.195 The deletion of the NPCG from the Constitution paved the way for
the BAL to rig the general election scheduled for January 2014. This disturbing
scheme, which had the dreadful impact of robbing Bangladeshis’ votes of
meaning, persuaded the BNP and other opposing political parties to take to the
streets to demand the restoration of the NPCG.196 They staged strikes and
blockades throughout 2013, which often turned violent.197
However, Hasina, in the same manner as her father, Mujib, sought to put
down opposition through extrajudicial killings. In 2013 alone, security forces
extrajudicially killed 329 individuals—127 of whom were political activists
opposing the BAL.198 These killings were carried out to systematically remove
impediments to Hasina’s design of securing unfettered power through the
supervision of a questionable general election in January 2014.199 It should,
however, be stressed that extrajudicial killings were not solely confined to the
victimization of opposition leaders. Rather the tool was also used to launch a
brutal crackdown on anyone who protested the policies of the regime. In this
context, reference can be made to the extrajudicial killing of supporters of
Hefazat-e-Islam—a coalition of various Islamic Organizations—on May 5,
2013.200 In 2013, Hefazat had mobilized a credible movement demanding two
193
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things: punishment for atheist bloggers who had published defamatory
statements about the religion of Islam, Allah, and Prophet Muhammad; and the
enactment of a stricter law on blasphemy.201 Hefazat considered the
government’s inaction on these two issues as tacit support for the bloggers.202
Things ultimately came to a head on May 5, 2013, when Hefazat called for a
program to “siege” Dhaka—the capital of Bangladesh.203 Although Hefazat
activists were allowed to gather at Shapla Square, which is at the heart of the
commercial hub of Dhaka, shortly after midnight, 10,000 joint security force
personnel launched an unprecedented crackdown on the unarmed Hefazat
activists.204 It is estimated that the security forces killed at least sixty-one
activists during its notorious “Operation Shapla”.205 The brutality of the regime
is further exemplified by the fact that those killed during the operation included
children who were studying at various Madrassas and had come to express their
solidarity with the Hefazat movement.206
It is also striking that in an effort to shroud its brutality under a veil of
secrecy, the regime turned the electricity off at Shapla Square and the
surrounding area prior to the commencement of the operation.207 It also stopped
the transmission of two television channels’ live broadcast of the crackdown.208
Odhikar, one of the leading human rights organizations in Bangladesh,
published a report on June 10, 2013, detailing the violence inflicted on the
Hefazat activists.209 However, within two months of publication, the BAL
regime arrested Adilur Rahman Khan—the Secretary of Odhikar.210 Khan’s
arrest was followed by the arrest of his colleague, ASM Nasiruddin Elan—the
Director of Odhikhar—on November 6, 2013.211 Both were charged under the
draconian Section 57 of the Information and Communication Technology Act,
2006, which became a convenient tool for the BAL regime to stifle free
201
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speech.212 Khan and Elan were charged with “publishing false images and
information” concerning the operation at Shapla Square and for “disrupting the
law and order situation of the country.”213 Thus, it is obvious that the regime did
not merely stop at violating the most fundamental human right—namely, the
right to life—but also sought to persecute human rights defenders for bringing
to the fore the perpetration of these gross violations through the publication of
an objective report in exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom
of expression.214
By December 2013, 764 individuals had been killed extrajudicially.215 It is
therefore clear that toward the end of the BAL regime’s tenure, it had, through
the use of draconian tools such as extrajudicial killings, manifested its distinct
advance towards instituting tyranny in Bangladesh.
B. Extrajudicial Killings During the BAL’s Rule from January 2014 to
December 2018
Due to the repressive measures pointed out above in Part VIII.A, the BAL
managed to fend off the threats posed by the opposition movement for the
restoration of the NPCG.216 Subsequently, it supervised a “one-sided and voterless” general election in January 2014 to maintain its stranglehold on power.217
All major opposition political parties, including the BNP, boycotted the election
over the prospect of it being rigged by the BAL in the absence of the NPCG.218
Due to such boycott, the BAL-led alliance won 154 of the 300 parliamentary
seats unopposed, thereby masterminding the majority required to form a
government before people were even afforded the opportunity to exercise their
democratic right to vote.219 When elections for the remaining 146 seats were
held on January 5, 2014, only twenty percent of the electorate casted their
vote.220 It should be stressed that although the BAL managed to secure its
survival in power, it lacked any democratic accountability. Consequently, the
BAL regime became even more despotic. In particular, the regime began to
212
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indiscriminately use the heinous tool of extrajudicial killings. An attempt will
now be made to shed light on some of the most notable instances of killings
during the period between January 2014 and December 2018.
1. The Killing of Opposition Activists and the Seven-Murder in
Narayanganj
In 2014 alone, the regime extrajudicially killed 172 individuals.221
Strikingly, thirty-five of those killed were grassroot leaders of either the BNP or
the Jamaat.222 The gruesome manner in which some of these individuals were
killed came to the fore after details concerning the “seven-murder” in
Narayanganj emerged.223 On April 27, 2014, RAB officers abducted Nazrul
Islam, a panel mayor of the Narayanganj City Corporation, on the orders of BAL
leader and political adversary, Nur Hossain.224 Islam’s close associates were not
spared either. Islam was abducted along with six others—three of his associates;
the driver of his vehicle; his lawyer, Chander Kumar Sarkar; and Sarkar’s
driver.225 The mutilated bodies of these individuals were found floating in the
Shitalakhya river in Narayanganj three days after their abduction.226 Their postmortem report revealed that they had been “strangled to death after being
knocked unconscious by a blow to the head.”227 It can be argued that these brutal
killings were carried out within a few months of the controversial polls in
January 2014 to impede the opposition’s ability to organize a popular movement
and to instill fear in the larger population.
2. The Killing of Nurul Islam Nuru—A Grassroot Leader of the BNP
As part of the BAL’s systematic campaign of suppressing its political
adversaries and the general population, on March 29, 2017, security forces
221
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picked up Nurul Islam Nuru—a BNP leader—from his residence in
Chittagong.228 Within a few hours of being picked up, his dead body was found
floating in the Karnaphuli river.229 He was not only shot twice in the head but
his body bore the marks of several injuries.230 Thus, the merciless killing of Nuru
resembled the brutality that had been inflicted on Islam and his six associates.
3. The Extrajudicial Killing of 285 Individuals under the Guise of the “War
on Drugs” in 2018
As the BAL’s second consecutive term in office was drawing to a close in
2018, it began to take concrete measures to supervise yet another controversial
general election to maintain its iron-grip on power. In anticipation of resistance
from the opposition and the larger population, in May 2018, the BAL
government launched the so-called “war on drugs.”231 Although the stated
objective of the operation was to combat the proliferation of the use of illicit
drugs in the country, it soon became evident that the operation was a cover for
terrorizing the population into political submission. From May to December of
2018, law enforcement agencies extrajudicially killed as many as 285
individuals in drug raids.232 Although the regime claimed that those killed were
drug peddlers who engaged in gunfights with law enforcement agencies, there
were no reports of any member of law enforcement being injured or killed in
these exchanges of gunfire.233 Furthermore, bigwigs and drug lords remained
outside the purview of the campaign and of law. Most notably, a ruling party
MP, whose name had time and again appeared in intelligence reports as the
leading drug lord, was not brought to justice.234
The operation was also used to target opposing grassroots leaders. For
instance, a number of BNP activists were killed extrajudicially by law
enforcement agencies during the operation.235 In an attempt to show that the
228
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BNP men killed in the operation were drug dealers, drugs were conveniently
placed beside their dead bodies.236
During the course of 2018, another 181 individuals were killed
extrajudicially in addition to those killed during the “war on drugs.”237 Thus, law
enforcement agencies executed a total of 466 individuals in 2018—the highest
number of killings in a single year.238
In the five years following the sham election of January 2014, the regime
extrajudicially killed 1157 individuals.239 Therefore, in contrast to the period
between December 2009 and January 2013, it is evident that there was a sharp
increase in the number of extrajudicial executions since the BAL usurped power
through the voter-less general election of January 2014.
C. Extrajudicial Killings Following the General Election of 2018
Although the BNP and its allies remained resolute in their demand for the
restoration of the NPCG to supervise a free and fair general election in
December 2018, their ability to organize a credible popular movement for
compelling the BAL to accept this demand was severely impeded. This was due
to the regime’s systematic oppression of the population through, among other
things, extrajudicial killings.240 Consequently, the BAL regime succeeded in
supervising another sham general election on December 30, 2018, allowing
Hasina yet again to rule unchallenged.241 The credibility of the election was
marred by widespread electoral malpractices perpetrated by BAL activists with
the aid of the government machineries.242 These malpractices included stamping
and stuffing ballot papers on the day and night before the election, preventing
people from entering polling stations to vote, and forcing voters to cast their
votes in favor of the BAL.243 By virtue of these unprecedented levels of fraud,

amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/1265/2019/en; Vidhi Doshi, 138 People Killed in 2 Months in Bangladesh
People Crackdown on Drug Dealers, WASH. POST (July 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
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the BAL secured a crushing victory over its opponents, winning 288 of the 300
parliamentary seats.244 Hence, Bangladeshis were stripped of their democratic
right to vote in a free and fair general election for the second time in five years.
Securing a third consecutive term in office, however, has not persuaded the
BAL government to cease its unconstitutional actions. Since January 2019, the
law enforcement agencies have extrajudicially killed another 723 individuals—
391 in 2019, 225 in 2020, and 107 in 2021.245 Those killed include school
students, auto-rickshaw drivers, farmers, hawkers, garment workers, and
shopkeepers.246 Furthermore, any attempt to oppose the regime’s policies has
been violently put down through targeted killings. In this context, reference can
be made to the demonstrations organized in March 2021 by leftist political
parties and Hefazat, protesting the impending arrival of the Prime Minister of
India, Narendara Modi, who had been invited by Hasina to attend celebrations
marking the golden jubilee of Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan and the
birth centenary of Mujib—Hasina’s father.247 The protests infuriated the regime
to the extent that in an attempt to crush them, law enforcement agencies killed
at least ten Hefazat activists.248
Thus, it is manifestly apparent that notwithstanding the commitments made
by the BAL and its leader prior to taking office in January 2009, state-sponsored
extrajudicial killings have become the norm in Bangladesh. By subjecting an
astounding number of individuals to extrajudicial killings in the past twelve and
a half years, the BAL has instilled the fear in the larger population that they will
suffer the same fate if they express discontent or opposition to the BAL’s
actions.
VIII. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE BAL GOVERNMENT’S VIOLATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
As discussed in Part II, the Constitution of Bangladesh not only guarantees
an impressive array of human rights, including the right to life, but also stipulates
that respect for human rights and the dignity of the human person shall form the
basis of all state actions. However, in contravention of these guarantees, there
244
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has been state-sponsored killing of nearly 3000 individuals in the past twelve
years, as detailed above in VII. These killings have put people in fear for their
lives and enabled the BAL to rule unopposed. Arguably, such killings have had
a grave psychological impact on the family members of the victims.249
In a constitutional democracy, each of the three branches of the
government—namely, the executive, legislature and judiciary—has a distinct
role to play in safeguarding the rule of law and the fundamental liberties of
individuals. Thus, this section will explore whether the other two branches of
the government—namely, the Parliament and Judiciary—have been able to hold
the BAL Executive responsible for extrajudicial killings.
A. Parliamentary Scrutiny (or Lack Thereof) of the BAL Government’s
Actions
A fundamental feature of parliamentary democracies is for the parliament to
hold the executive accountable by “scrutinizing, criticizing and, if necessary,
advocating changes” to their policies.250 In this context, the observations of John
Stuart Mill are noteworthy:
The proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control
the government: to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a
full exposition and justification of all of them which anyone considers
questionable; to censure them if found condemnable, and, if the men
who compose the government abuse their trust, or fulfil it in a manner
which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel
them . . . .251

However, the Parliament produced by the general elections of both 2014 and
2018 in Bangladesh have been devoid of any actual opposition which would
sustain the struggle for upholding the rule of law by stimulating responsible and
reasoned debate about the BAL regime’s actions. The BNP and its allies
boycotted the polls in 2014 amid fears of widespread fraud following the
deletion of the NPCG from the Constitution in 2011.252 In the subsequent
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L.J. 469, 471 (2020).
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election held in 2018, the BNP won only six seats due to massive electoral
malpractices perpetrated by the incumbent BAL administration.253
Consequently, the BAL has strategically maneuvered to persuade its principal
electoral ally, the JP, to act as the “domestic puppet opposition” in the
Parliament since January 2014.254 Furthermore, during the period between
January 2014 and December 2018, the BAL even rewarded the JP lawmakers
with ministerial positions, thereby further blurring the distinction between the
government and the opposition.255 These issues have been compounded by the
anti-defection provision in Article 70 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, which
obligates MPs to defer to the whims of their political parties in the discharge of
their responsibilities to retain their seats in the Parliament.256 Consequently, the
BAL’s maneuverings, coupled with the requirements prescribed by Article 70,
have seriously impeded the competence of MPs to scrutinize the actions of the
BAL regime without fear and subsequently hold it accountable for committing
gross violations of human rights. Instead, MPs in Bangladesh sing songs in the
Parliament praising Hasina,257 thereby making a mockery of the institution.
Thus, by supervising two sham general elections in past seven years, the BAL
regime has managed to reduce the Parliament into a toothless body.
B. The Judicial Response to the BAL Regime’s Extrajudicial Killings
In constitutional democracies, the judiciary is considered an impenetrable
bulwark against arbitrary encroachment on the constitutional liberties of
individuals. In this context, the observations of the Indian Supreme Court in the
2013 case of Suresh Singh v. Union of India258 are noteworthy:
[I]n a situation where the Court finds a person’s rights, especially the
right to life under assault by the State or the agencies of the State, it
must step-in and stand with the individual and prohibit the State or its
agencies from violating the rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
That is the role of this Court and it would perform it under all
circumstances.259
253
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Accordingly, the Constitution of Bangladesh entrusts the HCD of the Supreme
Court with the responsibility to act as the guardian and protector of the
fundamental rights of the people by stipulating in Article 102(1) that the HCD:
on the application of any person aggrieved, may give such directions
or orders to any person or authority, including any person performing
any function in connection with the affairs of the Republic, as may be
appropriate for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights
conferred by Part III of this Constitution.260

In an attempt to limit the possibility of the executive imposing undue restrictions
on the rights of individuals, Article 102(2) of the Constitution further provides
that the
High Court Division may, if satisfied that no other equally efficacious
remedy is provided by law . . . on the application of any person, make
an order . . . directing that a person in custody be brought before it so
that it may satisfy itself that he is not being held in custody without
lawful authority or in an unlawful manner.261

The importance of the protection afforded by this provision was underscored in
the case of Abdul Latif Mirza v Government of Bangladesh,262 when Chief
Justice Kemaluddin Hossain observed:
The Constitution . . . has cast a duty upon the High Court to satisfy
itself, that a person in custody is being detained under an authority of
law, or in a lawful manner. The purpose of the Constitution is to confer
on the High Court with the power to satisfy itself that a person detained
in custody, is under an order which is lawful . . . The Bangladesh
Constitution, therefore, provides for a judicial review of an executive
action . . . The High Court, therefore, in order to discharge its
constitutional function of judicial review, may call upon the detaining
authority to disclose the materials upon which it has so acted, in order
to satisfy itself that the authority has not acted in an unlawful
manner.263

However, the actual response of the HCD to prevent the BAL government’s
arbitrary deprivation of the most fundamental liberty of individuals—namely the
right to life—has been less than satisfactory. In fact, it did not provide any

260
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efficacious remedy to the victims of state-sponsored extrajudicial killings until
August 2017. However, a shift in the attitude of the judiciary had occurred much
earlier. On May 5, 2014, the HCD took suo moto notice of the brutality
perpetrated by the BAL regime following the extrajudicial execution of seven
individuals in Narayanganj, as discussed above in Part VII.B.1.264 The HCD
issued a ruling directing the government to form a committee to investigate the
alleged involvement of RAB officers in these political killings.265 However, the
HCD’s willingness to take notice of the extrajudicial killings was met with a
hostile response by the BAL regime. On September 17, 2014—only four months
and twelve days after the issuance of the suo moto rule—the BAL government
used its absolute majority in the Parliament to pass the Constitution (Sixteenth
Amendment) Act, 2014,266 which seriously eroded the independence of the
judiciary.
As discussed in Part III, Mujib had diminished the independence of the
judiciary by assuming the unilateral power to remove the justices of the Supreme
Court through the enactment of the Fourth Amendment. However, to restore the
public’s confidence in the ability of the judiciary to decide cases independent of
the wishes of the government of the day, the regime of General Zia introduced
a new transparent method of removal for Supreme Court justices.267 This
method, which was incorporated in the Constitution of Bangladesh by the
Proclamations (Tenth Amendment) Order, 1977, and was later affirmed by the
Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1979, prescribed that a justice of the
Supreme Court could only be removed from office by the President on the
recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC)—a body composed of
the Chief Justice and the next two most-senior justices of the Supreme Court.268
The SJC was empowered to put forward such a drastic recommendation only
after it had determined, following an inquiry, that the justice-at-issue had
“ceased to be capable of properly performing the functions of his office by
reason of physical or mental incapacity,” or had “been guilty of gross
misconduct.”269 Notably, to enable the SJC to conduct its inquiry in an impartial
manner, the Constitution deprived the executive of the opportunity to choose the
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membership of the SJC by stipulating that the latter would be composed of the
senior-most justices of the Supreme Court.
This method of removing justices is in line with the international norms
concerning judicial independence, which advocate that removal of judges should
involve a thorough and transparent investigation carried out by a body of judicial
character so as to deprive political branches the opportunity to remove judges at
their pleasure.270 For instance, the Latimer House Guidelines for the
Commonwealth, 1998, provide that “[i]n cases where a judge is at risk of
removal, the judge must have the right to be fully informed of the charges, to be
represented at a hearing, to make full defence and to be judged by an independent
and impartial tribunal.”271
However, notwithstanding the efficacy of the above process in guaranteeing
security of tenure for the judges of the highest court of law in Bangladesh,272 the
BAL, through the Sixteenth Amendment, replaced it with a parliamentary
method of removal of judges. The objective underlying this Amendment was
obvious. Since the Parliament resultant of the 2014 general election remained,
as pointed out in Part VIII.A, firmly under the thumb of the BAL executive, a
parliamentary method of removal was preferred to bring the judiciary under the
control of the regime. Furthermore, the existence of the anti-defection provision
contained in Article 70, as discussed in Part VIII.A, impeded the ability of MPs
to follow their conscience and ignore the directions of the BAL hierarchy when
called upon to consider the fate of a judge accused of incapacity or misconduct.
However, the BAL’s design to curb the independence of the judiciary was
thwarted by the Supreme Court when the constitutionality of the Sixteenth
Amendment was challenged by nine lawyers.273 Both the HCD and Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court struck down the amendment as being
“colourable, void and ultra vires the Constitution . . . of Bangladesh.”274 The
justices put forward a number of reasonings in support of their decision to
invalidate the Sixteenth Amendment. First, the justices duly shed light on the
adverse impact of Article 70 on the competence of the MPs to act independently
of the wishes of their nominating political parties, and concluded that the
270
THE RULE OF LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF JURISTS 157
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271
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Sixteenth Amendment made the justices of the Supreme Court vulnerable to the
dictates of the “Cabinet of the ruling party[.]”275 This arrangement, therefore,
undermined the Court’s ability to dispense justice impartially.276 Subsequently,
the learned justices observed that since the principle of judicial independence is
recognized as a basic structure of the Constitution,277 it “cannot be demolished,
whittled down, curtailed or diminished” by a constitutional amendment.278
Article 7B of the Constitution279 stipulates that “the provisions . . . relating to
the basic structures of the Constitution . . . shall not be amendable by way of
insertion, modification, substitution, repeal or by any other means.”280 Thus, the
Supreme Court decided that the BAL’s attempt to subvert the independence of
the judiciary by means of the Sixteenth Amendment clearly violated the terms
of Article 7B.281
However, in delivering the judgment of the Appellate Division—the highest
appellate court—to uphold the unconstitutionality of the Sixteenth Amendment,
on August 1, 2017, Chief Justice S.K. Sinha—the first non-Muslim Justice to
head the Bangladeshi Judiciary282—went further than any other judge in
denouncing the BAL regime’s attempt to undermine the independence of the
judiciary. He observed:
The greed for power is like a plague, once set in motion it will try to
devour everything. Needless to say, this WAS NOT at all the aims and
vision of our liberation struggle. Our Forefathers fought to establish a
democratic State, not to produce any power-monster.
The human rights are at stake, corruption is rampant, Parliament is
dysfunctional, crores of people are deprived of basic health care,
mismanagement in the administration is acute, with the pace of the
developed technology, the crimes dimension is changing rapidly, the
life and security of the citizens are becoming utterly unsecured, the
275
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law enforcing agencies are unable to tackle the situation and the
combined result of all this is a crippled society, a society where good
man does not dream of good things at all; but the bad man is all the
more restless to grab a few more of bounty. In such a situation, the
Executive becomes arrogant and uncontrolled . . .
Even in this endless challenge, the judiciary is the only relatively
independent organ of the State which is striving to keep its nose above
the water though sinking. But judiciary too, cannot survive long in this
situation . . . [However] [i]nstead of strengthening the judiciary, the
Executive is now trying to cripple it and if it happens, there could be
disastrous consequences.283

The declaration of the Sixteenth Amendment as unconstitutional reinstated the
constitutional provisions concerning the SJC.284 The manner in which the seniormost judges of the country stood up for the rule of law had a profoundly
beneficial impact on the independence of the puisne justices of the HCD to
deliver justice to the victims of extrajudicial killings. Within twenty-one days of
Chief Justice Sinha’s judgment in the Sixteenth Amendment case, a twomember bench of the HCD in the Seven-Murder Case sentenced fifteen
individuals to death for their role in the brutal killing of seven individuals in
Narayanganj.285 Among those sentenced were Nur Hossain—the BAL leader
who had ordered the killings—and ex-RAB officers including Tareque Sayeed
Mohammad—the son-in-law of the then-Minister for Relief and Disaster
Management in the BAL government—who had carried out these crimes.286
The firmness and independence demonstrated by the judiciary gave rise to
the transient hope that it would finally assume its role as the bulwark of
democratic values, such as respect for the rule of law and liberties of individuals.
However, the BAL regime took calculated steps to ensure this hope did not turn
into a reality. Within only four days of the delivery of the HCD’s judgment in
the Seven-Murder Case, and twenty-five days after Chief Justice Sinha’s
judgment in the Sixteenth Amendment Case, the BAL launched a scathing attack
on the judiciary by calling into question the character and integrity of the Chief
Justice. Prime Minister Hasina and prominent members of her cabinet called for

283

Id. at 682.
Id.
285
High Court Releases Full Text of Narayanganj Seven-Murder Case Verdict, DHAKA TRIB. (Nov. 19,
2018, 11:27 PM), https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/court/2018/11/19/hc-releases-full-text-of-sevenmurder-case-verdict.
286
Ashutosh Sarkar & Tuhin Shubhra Adhikary, Death for 15, Life Term for 11, DAILY STAR (Aug. 23,
2017, 12:55 PM), https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/narayanganj-7-murder-verdict-high-court-bangladesh-deathreference-appeal-death-15-life-term-11-1452607.
284

BARI_4.25.22

74

4/25/2022 2:08 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

the Chief Justice to either leave the country or seek treatment in a mental health
facility as, according to their estimation, the Chief Justice’s observations about
the regime in the Sixteenth Amendment Case made it evident that he was a
person of unsound mind.287 The BAL’s plan for the Chief Justice came to
fruition when the Law Minister announced on October 2, 2017, that the Chief
Justice would “go on a month’s leave . . . on health grounds.”288 However, the
announcement did not provide any insight into the actual health reasons that
rendered Justice Sinha “unable to perform the functions of his office.”289
Chief Justice Sinha left the country eleven days later, on October 13, 2017.290
However, before leaving the country he made it a point to contradict the official
story put forward by the regime as he remarked to the journalists that: “I’m not
sick. I’m not fleeing. I’ll come back. I’m a little embarrassed. I’m the guardian
of the judiciary. I’m leaving for a brief period in the interest of the judiciary, and
so that the judiciary is not polluted.”291 He also handed a one-page written
statement to the journalists, which further shed light on the political pressure
exerted on him: “[T]he way a political quarter, lawyers, and especially some
honourable ministers of the government and the honourable prime minister are
criticising me recently over a verdict made me embarrassed.”292
Chief Justice Sinha’s resolve in bringing to the fore the manner in which he
was victimized for his judgment in the Sixteenth Amendment Case further
angered the BAL regime. Within a few hours of the departure of the Chief
Justice, the regime instituted eleven charges against him, including “money
laundering, financial irregularities, corruption, [and] moral turpitude . . . .”293 It
should be stressed that the persecution of a sitting Chief Justice for his
courageous judgment in the Sixteenth Amendment Case, thwarting the BAL
regime’s attempt to diminish the independence of the judiciary, marked a
watershed moment in the history of the nation.294 Owing to such persecution,
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Chief Justice Sinha ultimately resigned on November 11, 2017295—eighty-two
days before the expiration of his tenure.
The unceremonious manner in which the head of the judiciary was forced
out of office has affected the independence of judges to decide cases in a fearless
and impartial manner where the BAL regime is a party.296 This argument is
bolstered by the fact that since the ouster of Chief Justice Sinha, the judiciary
has shied away from dispensing justice to the scores of victims of statesponsored extrajudicial killing, in dereliction of its constitutional duty. This has
subsequently enabled security forces to operate in a climate of impunity.
Thus, to govern in an unconstrained manner, the BAL regime has taken
drastic measures to systematically impede the competence of both the
Parliament and judiciary to act as checks on its powers, thereby becoming “the
unlimited master of the State.”297
IX. BANGLADESH’S OBLIGATIONS TO UPHOLD CORE HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, 1966
The Constitution of Bangladesh, as discussed in the Introduction and Part II,
guarantees a wide array of fundamental rights, including the right to life.
Furthermore, Bangladesh acceded to the ICCPR, considered “the most important
universal instrument on human rights,”298 on September 6, 2000.299 Although
the ICCPR, as pointed out in the Introduction, recognizes the right to life as nonderogable, the Constitution of Bangladesh has not been amended to afford the
same level of protection to the right to life so as to deter the government from
arbitrarily and unlawfully depriving people of their lives through extrajudicial
killings.300
Additionally, Article 40 of the ICCPR imposes an obligation on states parties
to submit initial reports detailing how they have given effect to their obligations
under the ICCPR “[w]ithin one year of the entry into force of the . . . Covenant
for the States Parties concerned.”301 However, Bangladesh submitted its initial
report to the Human Rights Committee (HRC), a body entrusted with the
295
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responsibility to ensure compliance of states parties with the human rights
standards envisaged by the ICCPR, on June 19, 2015—almost fourteen years
after the due date.302 The HRC, in its concluding observations on Bangladesh’s
initial report, expressed its concern at the “high rate of extrajudicial killings by
police officers, soldiers and Rapid Action Battalion [RAB] force members” and
at the “lack of investigations and accountability of perpetrators . . . .”303
Consequently, the Committee recommended that the Bangladesh government
should “[t]ake immediate measures to protect the right to life of all persons,”
“[i]nvestigate all cases of arbitrary killings . . . [and] prosecute and punish
convicted perpetrators with appropriate sanctions. . . .”304
However, the BAL regime refuted the HRC’s assertions in its official
response by claiming that it had taken “meaningful actions to bring incidents of
human rights violations to a very low level.”305 The regime made such a claim
notwithstanding the fact that the number of extrajudicial killings, as discussed
earlier in VII, has risen to record levels during its time in office.
Since the ICCPR does not prescribe an effective adversarial mechanism for
securing compliance of states parties with HRC’s conclusions,306 the BAL
regime has taken advantage of such a weakness by disregarding the above
recommendations altogether. Subsequently, the regime has continued to resort
to the heinous tool of extrajudicial killings in contravention of its obligations
under both domestic and international law to prevent the arbitrary and unlawful
deprivation of life.307
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion reveals that when Bangladesh emerged as an
independent nation on December 16, 1971, the founding fathers sought to
establish a liberal democracy that would ensure the observance of the rule of law
and safeguard the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of
individuals.308 To this end, they incorporated extensive guarantees into the
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Constitution of Bangladesh, including an impressive eighteen fundamental
rights and the stipulation that respect for human rights shall form the basis of all
state actions.309 However, as is evident from the discussion in this Article, the
promise of a liberal democracy has remained elusive in Bangladesh. In fact,
these democratic values began to be discarded within a year of the nation
securing its independence. As pointed out in Part III, the BAL government
resorted to extrajudicial killings for the first time to realize Mujib’s aspiration of
retaining power permanently. The BAL regime utilized such killings to violently
put down Mujib’s political opponents.310 Furthermore, Mujib used the
overwhelming majority of his party in the Parliament to get the Fourth
Amendment passed on January 25, 1975, which systematically dismantled the
checks on his powers by bringing both the Parliament and judiciary under his
absolute control.311 This set a dangerous precedent for succeeding generations
of executives in Bangladesh—namely, that the desire to perpetuate survival in
power takes precedence over democratic values, such as respect for the
fundamental human rights.
Although subsequent governments sporadically resorted to extrajudicial
killing, the number of such killings has reached unprecedented levels since
Hasina, Mujib’s daughter, returned to power for the second time in January
2009. These killings have been carried out to fulfill Hasina’s political ambition
of clinging to power permanently. Since January 2009, security forces have
extrajudicially killed almost 3000 individuals.312 Although the regime has
maintained that those killed were criminals who engaged in exchanges of gunfire
with security forces, this is a far cry from reality. Those killed not only include
Hasina’s political adversaries, but also innocent members of the general
public.313 Even the unprecedented challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic
have not deterred the regime from indiscriminately killing individuals.314
In taking a page from her father’s playbook, Hasina has proceeded in a
calculated manner to remove the checks on her power to ensure that neither she
nor her government can be held accountable for the gross violation of the most
fundamental human right of Bangladeshis through the use of extrajudicial
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killings. First, she used her party’s majority in the Parliament to dispense with
the NPCG-system, which had been instrumental in safeguarding people’s right
to vote in free and fair general elections. She then organized two sham general
elections in January 2014 and December 2018, and consequently produced a
toothless Parliament devoid of any actual opposition.315 Second, she got the
subservient Parliament to pass the Sixteenth Amendment to bring the judiciary
under her control. Finally, when the Supreme Court thwarted her design to rob
the judiciary of its independence, her regime forced the head of the judiciary out
of office as a retaliatory measure to ensure that the judiciary adopts a highly
deferential attitude when called on to examine the regime’s actions. It is
therefore evident that the BAL regime, which has ruled the nation
uninterruptedly for the past twelve and a half years, has become a “source of
terror to all its citizens and . . . [has] create[d] a country where everyone lives in
fear.”316 Accordingly, it is necessary to undertake the following reforms in
Bangladesh.
Although the Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees the right to life, the
protection afforded to this right is not absolute, notwithstanding the nation’s
accession to the ICCPR in September 2000. Consequently, successive
governments have merely paid lip service to the idea of safeguarding this most
fundamental human right. It is therefore imperative that an amendment be
introduced into the Constitution to make the right to life non-derogable. The
incorporation of such a non-derogable guarantee will have the salutary effect of
obligating the Parliament to insert detailed provisions in the criminal law
framework of the nation requiring authorities to investigate allegations of
extrajudicial killing and specifying appropriate punishment for anyone found
guilty of resorting to such a draconian tool. Thus, making the right to life nonderogable under all circumstances will impede the ability of members of security
forces to justify extrajudicially killing anyone accused of committing heinous
crimes and, as such, will have the beneficial impact of reducing such killings in
the country.
However, the insertion of the above guarantee would be an exercise in
futility unless the conventional constitutional checks on the powers of the
executive are reinstated. Therefore, the insertion of a non-derogable right to life
should be complemented through the introduction of the following reforms:
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a) Since the BAL’s stratagem of deleting the NPCG-system from the
Constitution has ensured the subservience of Parliament, the constitutional
provisions concerning the NPCG should be reinstated. The reintroduction
of the NPCG will have a twofold effect. First, such reintroduction will
facilitate the revival of participatory democracy in Bangladesh, thereby
enabling the citizens to elect governments truly representative of their
choice through periodic free and fair elections. Second, it will enable the
Parliament to duly exercise its oversight function and thereby “act as a
brake upon the power of the executive branch.”317
b) Since an independent judiciary is considered an indispensable feature
of any society based on democratic values, it is imperative that the BAL
regime refrains from exerting undue pressure on judges so as to deter them
from administering the law impartially in performance of their
constitutional duties. In this context, the observations of Henry Sidgwick
are noteworthy:
[I]n determining a nation’s rank in political civilization, no test is
more decisive than the degree in which justice as defined by the
law is actually realized in its judicial administration; both as
between one private citizen and another, and as between citizens
and members of the Government.318

The implementation of the above reforms would go a long way toward putting
an end to indiscriminate extrajudicial killing in Bangladesh as a convenient
means for ensuring survival in power. Consequently, it would contribute to the
realization of the democratic virtues which inspired “people to dedicate
themselves to, and . . . to sacrifice their lives in, the national liberation
struggle”319 against Pakistan.
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